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With increasing advancements in technology, it is expected that the emergence of a quantum
computer will potentially break many of the public-key cryptosystems currently in use. It will
negotiate the confidentiality and integrity of communications. In this regard, we have privacy
protectors (i.e. Post-Quantum Cryptography), which resists attacks by quantum computers, deals
with cryptosystems that run on conventional computers and are secure against attacks by quantum
computers. The practice of code-based cryptography is a trade-off between security and efficiency.
In this chapter, we have explored The most successful McEliece cryptosystem, based on extended
Golay code [24, 12, 8]. We have examined the implications of using an extended Golay code in
place of usual Goppa code in McEliece cryptosystem. Further, we have implemented a McEliece
cryptosystem based on extended Golay code using MATLAB. The extended Golay code has lots of
practical applications. The main advantage of using extended Golay code is that it has codeword
of length 24, a minimum Hamming distance of 8 allows us to detect 7-bit errors while correcting for
3 or fewer errors simultaneously and can be transmitted at high data rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, public key cryptosystems (Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the RSA cryptosystem, digital
signature algorithm (DSA), and Elliptic curve cryptosystems) has become a crucial component of cyber security. In
this regard, security depends on the difficulty of a definite number of theoretic problems (integer factorization or
the discrete log problem). Table 1 represents the present status of several cryptosystems [1]. Shor’s algorithm is
well-known in the field of cryptography given its potential application in cracking various cryptosystems, such as RSA
algorithm and elliptic curve cryptography [2]. These all public key cryptosystems can be attacked in polynomial time
using Shor’s algorithm.
TABLE I: Impact of Quantum computing on cryptographic algorithms [1]
Cryptosystem Broken by Quan-
tum algorithms?
Diffie-Hellman key-exchange [3] Broken
RSA public key encryption [4] Broken
Algebraically Homomorphic [5] Broken
Buchmann-Williams key-exchange [6] Broken
Elliptic curve cryptography [7] Broken
NTRU public key encryption [8] Not broken yet
McEliece public key encryption [9] Not broken yet
Lattice-based public key encryption [10] Not broken yet
Post-Quantum Cryptography offers secure alternatives. The goal of post-quantum cryptography is to develop
cryptographic systems that are secure against both quantum and classical computers, and compatible with existing
communications protocols and networks. Apart from RSA, DSA, and ECDSA, there are other important classes of
cryptographic systems which include Code-based, Lattice-based, Hash-based, Multivariate-quadratic-equations and
Secret-key cryptosystem.
Code-based cryptography [11] generally refers to cryptosystems in which the algorithmic primitive uses an error
correcting code C. This primitive may consist of adding an error to a word of C or in computing a syndrome relatively
to a parity check matrix of C. There are several codes for which efficient decoders are known. Fig 1 shows the several
codes proposed and broken in code-based cryptography.
In 1949, Golay [12] discovered Golay codes. A binary Golay code is a linear error-correcting code used in digital
communication. Golay codes are perfect codes in which the Hamming spheres surrounding the codewords fill the
Hamming space without overlap. These spheres have a radius e, which can correct e errors and their codewords
separated from each other by a distance d=e+1. Perfect codes possess complete bounded-distance decoders and
satisfy the Hamming bound with equality. If Golay codes are augmented with bit interleaving technique, it enables us
to correct burst errors [13].
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2II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some preliminaries and basic notations are given, which will be used throughout the chapter.
• Linear code: Linear code C [14] of length n and dimension k over a field F is a k -dimensional subspace of the
vector space Fnq with q elements, a set of n-dimensional vectors can be referred to as a [n, k ] code and elements
of bits such that F=GF(2)={0,1}. If the minimum Hamming distance of the code is d, then the code is called
a [n, k, d ] code.
• Hamming distance: A Hamming distance [13] dH(x, y) is the number of positions in which two codewords (x, y)
differ. Let C be a [n, k ] linear code over Fnq and x = (x1, x2, ..., xn), y = (y1, y2, ..., yn) are two code words.
dH(x, y) =| i : xi 6= yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n | (1)
• Hamming weight : A Hamming weight [13] wtH(x) is defined as the number of non-zero positions in the codeword
x. Let C be a [n, k ] linear code over Fnq and x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) is a code word, such that
wtH(x) =| i : xi 6= 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n | (2)
• Generator matrix : A generator matrix [13] for C is a k × n matrix G having the vectors of V = (v1, v2, ..., vk)
as rows, which forms a basis of C such that
C = {mG : m ∈ Fnq }, G =

v1
v2
...
vk
 (3)
The matrix G generates the code as a linear map: for each message m ∈ Fnq , we obtain the corresponding code
word mG.
• Dual code: Let C be a [n, k ] linear code over Fnq . The dual code [26] of C is the set, such that C⊥ = {x ∈ Fnq :
x.y = 0,∀y ∈ C} .
• Parity matrix : A (n − k) × n generator matrix H is called parity-check matrix [13] for codeword C, which is
described by
C = {m ∈ Fnq : mHT = 0}, (4)
III. PRIOR WORK
Originally, Golay codes [12] were invented in the early 1950s, and have experienced incredible responses in the
last few years. In 1978, McEliece [9] proposed an asymmetric encryption cryptosystem based on Goppa codes, which
remains unbroken, even after 15 years of adaptation of its proposal security parameters [15]. Niederreiter [16] proposed
a knapsack-type cryptosystem based on Reed-Solomon codes. Sidelnikov and Shestakov [14] attacked the Niederreiter
cryptosystem and proved that it is insecure using Reed-Solomon codes as well as Goppa codes.
Sidelnikov [17] proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on binary Reed-Muller codes. It offered a high security
with transmission rate close to 1, and complexity of encryption and decryption process is low. Minder and Shokrollahi
[18] attacked the Sidelnikov public-key cryptosystem which generates a private key from a known public key. It has
been shown that running time of the attack is subexponential using low weight finding algorithms.
Janwa and Moreno [19] proposed a McEliece public key cryptosystems based on Algebraic-Geometric Codes (AGC).
It shows the various aspects of McEliece cryptosystem, based on the larger class of q-ary algebraic-geometric Goppa
codes and listed some open problems for future improvements. Faure and Minder [20] presented an algorithm based
on algebraic geometry codes to recover the structure of algebraic geometry codes defined over a hyperelliptic code. In
2014, Couvreur et al. [21] constructed a polynomial time algorithm attack against public key cryptosystems based on
algebraic-geometric codes.
In 2000, Monico et al. [22] showed an efficient way of using low-density parity check codes in McEliece cryptosystem.
In 2007, Baldi et al. [23] introduced a new variant of McEliece cryptosystem, based on quasi-cyclic low-density parity
check (QCLDPC) codes. Furthermore, they examined the relevant attacks against LDPC and QCLDPC. Londahl
and Johansson [24] constructed a new version of McEliece cryptosystem based on convolutional codes. Landais and
Tillich [25] implemented an attack against McEliece cryptosystem based on convolutional codes. Various researchers
proposed modified McEliece cryptosystems by replacing Goppa codes and using different error-correcting codes, e.g.
algebraic geometric codes (AGC), low-density parity check codes (LDPCC) or convolutional codes. However, all of
these schemes have proven to be insecure, making Goppa codes a standard solution.
3IV. MCELIECE CRYPTOSYSTEM
McEliece cryptosystem is based on linear error-correcting code for creating public and private key. Binary Goppa
code [9] is used as the error-correcting code in McEliece cryptosystem. The secret key can be drawn from the
various alternate codes. Several versions of McEliece cryptosystem were proposed using various secret codes such as
Reed-Solomon codes, concatenated codes and Goppa codes. Interested researchers can study the original McEliece
cryptosystem algorithm described in [9].
V. GOLAY CODES
Golay codes can be classified into binary and ternary Golay codes. Furthermore, binary Golay codes are divided
into extended (G24) and perfect (G23) binary Golay codes [12, 13]. The extended binary Golay code G24 is a [24, 12,
8] code, which encodes 12 bits of data into a word of 24-bit length in such a way that any 3-bit errors can be corrected
or any 7-bit errors can be detected.
A23 =

0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0

The perfect binary Golay code G23 is a [23, 12, 7] code that is having a code word of length 23. It can be obtained
from the extended binary Golay code by deleting one coordinate position. It is useful in the applications where a
parity bit is added to each word for producing a half-rate code [26]. It is constructed by a factorization x23 − 1
over field Fm2 such that: x
23 − 1 = (x − 1)(x11 + x9 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x + 1)(x11 + x10 + x6 + x5 + x4 + x2 + 1),
g1(x) = (x
11 +x9 +x7 +x6 +x5 +x+ 1) and g2(x) = (x
11 +x10 +x6 +x5 +x4 +x2 + 1) are irreducible polynomials of
degree (m=11). These polynomials are reverse of each other and can generate the same cycle code words. Therefore,
the generator matrix 12× 23 of perfect binary Golay code is G23 = [I12, A23], where I12 is 12× 12 the identity matrix.
Matrix A23 is as follow:
A. Binary extended Golay codes
In 1977, extended Golay codes G24 [12] were used for error control on the Voyager 1 and 2 spacecraft launched
towards Jupiter and Saturn. The perfect binary Golay code results into 3-byte extended Golay code by adding a
parity bit. Some special properties of extended Golay Codes are:
• G24 is a self-dual code with a generator matrix G = [I12 | A].
• Parity check matrix for G24 is H = [A | I12] [27].
• Another generator and parity check matrix for G24 are G′ = [A | I12] and H = Gt[ AI12 ] respectively [28].
• The weight of every code word in G24 is a multiple of 4 and distance is 8.
The extended Golay code generated by the 12× 24 matrix G = [I12 | A], where I12 is 12× 12 the identity matrix and
matrix A is as shown below.
4A =

1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0

VI. MCELIECE CRYPTOSYSTEM USING EXTENDED GOLAY CODE
McEliece cryptosystem based on extended Golay code works similarly as McEliece cryptosystem, but it generates
the secret matrix G with a different way, and different decoding procedure will be used for the decoding process. Golay
code matrix A is having a cyclic structure, in which the second row is obtained by moving the first component to the
last position. Similarly, each row of the matrix A can be obtained by a right shift of the previous row, except last
one row. The matrix A is being a part of both the generator and the parity check matrices of extended Golay code;
its decoding procedure is very simple. The main idea is to replace the Goppa code used in McEliece by an extended
Golay code that can be efficiently decoded.
FIG. 1: McEliece Cryptosystem using extended Golay code
A. Key generation
McEliece cryptosystem based on extended Golay code, G24 encode 12-bits of data in 24-bit length of the word.
Random permutation matrix (P) acts on generator matrix (G). Then, reorder the computed matrix and named it
5Algorithm 1: Key generation
System parameters: Let F be a family of t-error correcting (t ∈ N) q-ary linear [n, k, d ] codes,
where t n.
Input: G24 [24, 12, 8] is an extended Golay which encodes (k=12) bits of data in a word of (n=24)
bit length and any (t=3) bit errors can be corrected.
Output matrices:
• Generate generator matrix G: k×n generator matrix for code C capable of correcting e errors
over F of dimension k. G← [I12 | A], where I12 is 12× 12 the identity matrix.
• Generate permutation matrix P : n× n is a random permutation matrix, having exactly 1 in
every row and column; with all other entries is zero.
• Compute k × n matrix G1 = GP , arrange G1 in systematic format of generator matrix and
named it as G2.
• Generate a non-singular invertible matrix S ∈ F k×k2 .
• Compute k × n matrix Gm ← SG2.
• Return public key: (Gm, t), private key: (S,G2, Da), where Da is an efficient decoding algo-
rithm.
as G2. Compute Gm ← SG2 by the random invertible matrix (S ) and makes the public key (Gm, t) and secret key
(S,G2, Da) correcting any 3-bit of errors. Key generation is described in algorithm 1. The detailed algorithm of
McEliece cryptosystem based on extended Golay code is given below.
B. Encoding
In encoding, the plaintext is a random non-zero binary vector of length k, i.e. (m ∈ F k2 ). A ciphertext (c ∈ Fn2 ) is
the code word of the code with generator matrix Gm and we choose random error vector (e ∈ Fn2 ) exactly of weight
t. The encoding process is defined in the algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Encoding
Input: Public key (Gm ∈ F k×n2 ), message (m ∈ F k2 ), error vector (e ∈ Fn2 ).
Output: Ciphertext (c ∈ Fn2 )
Compute y ← mGm
Add error vector c← y + e
Return c
C. Decoding
The decoding process is defined in the algorithm 3. It uses the decoding procedure of extended Golay code, whereas
original McEliece cryptosystem uses Patterson’s algorithm for the decoding process.
Algorithm 3: Decoding
Input: Ciphertext (c ∈ Fn2 ), Private key: (S,G2, Da)
Output: Original message (m ∈ F k2 )
Compute the encoded message y1 ← c + e, where e is calculated by calling subroutine Da(c,G2).
y1 ← mSG2 + e, compute message mS by row reducing [Gt2 | (mSG2)t].
Multiply mS by S−1.
Return m
Here, we call a subroutine Da(c), which computes an error vector described in the algorithm 4. Therefore, on
reading input a ciphertext (c ∈ Fn2 ), it generates an output as the original message (m ∈ F k2 ). In step 1, it computes
a syndrome using private key G2 checks whether the weight of syndrome s1 is less than or equal to 3. If yes, then
it returns an error vector e=[s1, 000000000000]. Otherwise, it checks the weight of (s1 + Ai) is less than or equal
6to 2, then the error vector is e=[s1 + Ai, ji]. If it does not satisfy the first condition, then further it computes the
second syndrome s2 and checks whether the weight of syndrome s2 is less than or equal to 3. If yes, then it returns
an error vector e=[000000000000, s2]. Otherwise, it checks the weight of (s2 +Ai) is less than or equal to 2, then the
error vector is e=[ji, s2 + Ai]. In any case, if both the conditions do not satisfy and the error pattern e is not yet
determined, then it requests retransmission. Finally, mS is found by row reducing form and the original message is
computed by multiplying mS by S−1.
Algorithm 4: DA(c,G2)
Input: Ciphertext (c ∈ Fn2 ), generator matrix (private): (G2)
Output: Error vector (e ∈ Fn2 )
Compute the first syndrome: s1 ← cG2
If wt(s1) ≤ 3, then
Return e ← [s1, 000000000000]
Else If wt(s1 + Ai) ≤ 2, then
Return e ← [s1 + Ai, ji], where ji the word of length 12 with 1 in the ith
position and 0 elsewhere in I12 identity matrix.
Else
Compute the second syndrome: s2 ← s1A
If wt(s2) ≤ 3, then
Return e ← [000000000000, s2]
Else If wt(s2 + Ai) ≤ 2, then
Return e ← [ji, s2 + Ai]
Else If the error pattern e is not yet determined, then request
retransmission.
D. Security
The security of the proposed McEliece cryptosystem depends on the difficulty level to decode y into message m.
The attacker will have a tough time trying to separate G2 from Gm because he/she does not know P and inverse of a
matrix S, which are not publicly available. Therefore, an attacker cannot find an error because its hard to recover the
specific structure of the matrix G2. Maximum-likelihood decoding can be used to recover error but making tables for
big codes (2n−k = 224−12 = 4096) coset leader is a time-consuming and inefficient. It also needs more storage space
and decoding time can be quite long also. Therefore, we rely on syndrome decoding of extended Golay code.
VII. IMPLEMENTATION OF MCELIECE CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON EXTENDED GOLAY CODE
We have used a personal computer to implement McEliece cryptosystem based on extended Golay code with the
following specification: CPU Intel Core i3-3217U 1.80 GHz, RAM 2.00 GB, OS Windows 8 Enterprise 32 bit and
MATLAB 7.11.0 (R2010b).
We have used 12× 24 generator matrix G=[I12 | A] to generate extended Golay code G24, where I12 is 12× 12 the
identity matrix. Fig. 2 shows the matrix A, which is obtained by adding a parity bit at the end of each codeword of
perfect Golay code G23. We have used the random permutation matrix 24 × 24 to compute G1 ← GP as shown in
Fig 3.
We have used the random function to generate 12 × 12 a random invertible matrix S of binary numbers. The
matrix G1 is reordered and renamed as G2, then we computed Gm = SG2, where Gm is the encoding matrix. Fig.
4 represents the random invertible matrix S. Furthermore, Gm encoding matrix results in public key: (Gm, t), the
private key consists of a random matrix S, systematic generator matrix G2 and Da efficient decoding algorithm such
that (S,G2, Da). We have used random plaintext m of length 12 and random error vector e of length is 24 having
weight (wt ≤ 3). Then, we compute codeword by y = mGm and encode it by computing ciphertext such that c = y+e.
Fig. 5 shows the computed Gm matrix codeword, random error, and ciphertext.
During decoding, we call a subroutine as described in Algorithm 4 for computing an error e by using private key
G2. Further, we recovered the actual codeword such that y = c + e. Fig 6 shows the calculated syndrome for error
detection in the ciphertext.
7FIG. 2: Generator polynomial matrix A of G24
FIG. 3: Random permutation matrix P
FIG. 4: Random invertible matrix S
Compute the error and actual codeword; we recover the plaintext by multiplying it with the inverse of S. Fig. 7
shows the actual message sent over the channel.
We have examined the McEliece cryptosystem using extended Golay code. The developed system is effective and
secure until S is chosen sparse random matrix. It corrects up to three-bit errors per codeword. Sparse matrices
make it efficient and it allows a significant compression. Moreover, we have implemented the McEliece cryptosystem
using extended Golay code and designed a finite state machine for its decoding component. In future, we will design
McEliece cryptosystem using extended Golay code associated with bit interleaving technique to correct bursts of errors
per codeword.
8FIG. 5: Generate ciphertext by adding intended error
FIG. 6: Error detection by calculating syndrome
FIG. 7: Decoding of Ciphertext
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have examined the McEliece cryptosystem using extended Golay code. The developed system is
effective and secure until S is chosen sparse random matrix. It corrects up to three-bit errors per codeword. Sparse
matrices make it efficient and allows a significant compression. Moreover, we have implemented the proposed McEliece
cryptosystem using MATLAB. In future, we will design of McEliece cryptosystem using extended Golay code associated
with bit interleaving technique to correct bursts of errors per codeword.
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